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Presidential Leadership  
& the Separation of Powers
Eric A. Posner
Abstract: The presidents who routinely are judged the greatest leaders are also the most heavily criticized 
by legal scholars. The reason is that the greatest presidents succeeded by overcoming the barriers erected by 
Madison’s system of separation of powers, but the legal mind sees such actions as breaches of constitutional 
norms that presidents are supposed to uphold. With the erosion of Madisonian checks and balances, 
what stops presidents from abusing their powers? The answer lies in the complex nature of presidential 
leadership. The president is simultaneously leader of the country, a party, and the executive branch. The 
conflicts between these leadership roles put heavy constraints on his power.
While the topic of presidential leadership has 
fascinated political scientists and historians for de-
cades, legal scholars have ignored it. Legal schol-
ars rarely discuss “leadership”–of the president or 
anyone else. They are concerned with the legal con-
straints on the presidency, not the opportunities that 
the office supplies to its occupant. Moreover, in con-
trast to political scientists and historians, who find 
it difficult to resist celebrating presidents who show 
great leadership qualities, legal scholars almost uni-
versally take a critical attitude toward the president.1 
And the leaders who commentators frequently judge 
as “great”–including Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow 
Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan–
receive the most critical attention. This is because 
those leaders turn out, with a few exceptions, to be 
the presidents who most frequently tread on consti-
tutional norms. This raises a paradox. How can our 
top presidential leaders also be major lawbreakers?2
To address this paradox, we start with the Consti-
tution. The Constitution says almost nothing about 
leadership. It does not identify a leader of the coun-
try, a head of state, or even a head of government. 
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By vesting the executive power in the pres-
ident, it implies that the president is lead-
er of the executive branch, but not that 
he is the leader of the country or the gov-
ernment. Moreover, not everyone agrees 
that the president is leader of the execu-
tive branch. Even today it is controversial 
whether executive agencies must answer 
to the president; the so-called independent 
agencies like the Federal Reserve do not. 
Congress sets up agencies and gives them 
their marching orders, controls their bud-
get, and routinely harangues their chiefs. 
And, of course, Congress demands that the 
president comply with its laws, citing the 
Constitution’s Take Care Clause and Su-
premacy Clause. The text of the Constitu-
tion could be read to envision a president 
who is merely an agent of Congress, one 
who has little discretion to exercise lead-
ership except perhaps over a small staff of 
assistants.
The Constitution is hardly clearer about 
Congress. It designates the vice president 
as president of the Senate, but in consti-
tutional practice, he is not its leader. The 
Constitution gives the Senate and House 
the power to elect officers, and the leader-
ship positions in those institutions emerge 
from that process. Even so, there is not a 
leader of the House or the Senate in a mean-
ingful sense. The real leadership positions 
are held by the top party official in each 
body; so Congress has four leaders, with 
the majority leaders being something like 
coequals. Finally, the Constitution does not 
create a leader of the courts (though it re-
fers in passing to a chief justice presiding 
over impeachment trials). Congress creat-
ed the position of chief justice, whose pow-
ers over the federal judiciary are limited.
Why does the Constitution say so little 
about leadership? The founders sought a 
more effective executive after the debacle 
of the Articles of Confederation, but they 
also feared an excessively powerful nation-
al government led by an imperial president 
or by a tyrannical legislature. Their solu-
tion was to supplement elections with the 
system of separation of powers. Elections 
would ensure that government officials en-
joyed popular support when they reached 
office, but they could not, by themselves, 
prevent those officials from accumulating 
power while in office or using it to main-
tain their position and abuse the public 
trust. The separation of powers addressed 
this risk. Madison argued that each of the 
three branches of government would com-
pete for power and in the process con-
strain each other. The usual picture is one 
in which the officials in each branch are 
motivated to inflate their personal power 
by expanding the power of the branch in 
which they operate, and hence by resisting 
the efforts of officials in other branches to 
extend their power. Actions that seek to re-
distribute power–actions that would re-
sult in power being concentrated in one of-
fice or branch–would be blocked. Actions 
that advance the public interest would 
(presumably) not be blocked. A separate 
executive branch would enable the govern-
ment to act quickly and decisively, but be-
cause the executive would derive most of 
its authority from Congress, it would be 
blocked from expanding its power.
Consistent with the Madisonian struc-
ture, then, the Constitution–more by im-
plication than by language–creates a group 
of leaders, but no leader of the nation. The 
government is a kind of institutional con-
federacy. The founders, who were well-
versed in classical history, may have en-
visioned a system like the Roman Repub-
lic, where there were leaders but no leader. 
The Roman Senate was a collective body, 
and men with distinctive gifts like Cice-
ro could emerge as leaders at critical mo-
ments. But leadership was fluid; it moved 
from one person to another in response to 
events. The most important office was the 
consul, but there always were two consuls, 
and they served only for a year. A dicta-
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tor could be authorized for short periods 
during military emergencies. These and 
many other restrictions on office-hold-
ing worked to block–or at least retard–
the emergence of charismatic individuals 
whose power derived from their personal-
ities, connections, accomplishments, and 
family lineage, rather than from their tem-
porary occupation of an institutional po-
sition. The Roman Republic survived for 
centuries without a king. Men who sought 
to become leaders, like Sulla and Caesar, 
were seen as usurpers. The imperial lead-
ership of Augustus and his successors was 
not possible until the Republic collapsed.
But the founders’ aversion to a national 
leader ran into trouble from the start. Even 
while debating in Philadelphia, it was wide-
ly understood that the new country would 
be led by a great man: George Washington. 
And he would not be Speaker of the House 
or chief justice; just as he was president of 
the Constitutional Convention, he would 
be president of the country. The selection of 
Washington was an obvious choice. He was 
not just the hero of the Revolution; he was 
a natural leader who had earned the trust 
of his officers and soldiers through many 
years of wartime military service. The new 
country’s best chance was to throw its lot 
to a man who already enjoyed the trust of 
the nation. And the position of president, 
rather than House Speaker or chief justice, 
was the obvious choice as well. Washing-
ton was a military man, and what the coun-
try needed was a military leader to protect 
it from Indians, Europeans, and internal 
dissenters. So while the founders drafted 
a document that failed to recognize a na-
tional leader, they prepared the way for the 
first and greatest national leader. The nega-
tion of presidential leadership was to be a 
legal fiction.
The immediate resort to presidential lead-
ership spelled trouble for the Madisonian 
system. The system of separation of pow-
ers was supposed to allow decisive action 
by the executive while blocking it or any 
other part of government from acquiring 
excessive power, but it has never been clear 
how this system could work. The Consti-
tution’s checks and balances simply make 
it difficult for the national government to 
act, whether for good or for bad. The ba-
sic problem with a government action–
whether a military operation, negotiation 
of a trade treaty, or the construction of a 
new canal–is that it creates losers as well as 
winners. Vetogates enable potential losers 
to head off government action that harms 
them, but the more vetogates that are built 
into the system, the easier it is for losers to 
block actions that may be in the public in-
terest. Even if the actions hurt no one at all, 
people located at the vetogates can block 
the action unless they receive special treat-
ment. Separation of powers, which is dis-
tinguished from other systems like parlia-
mentary government by the large number 
of vetogates it creates, just leads to gridlock 
and ineffective government.
The rise of presidential leadership, be-
ginning with George Washington, only 
partly ameliorated this problem. Wash-
ington alone entered office with a large 
enough wellspring of trust to enable him 
to use the office aggressively–and, even 
then, he frequently acted with extreme cau-
tion, careful to consult Congress and follow 
its laws even during emergencies like the 
Whiskey Rebellion. Only a few successors 
with exceptional talents–Jefferson, Jack-
son, maybe Polk–could overcome the bar-
riers to government action, and they did 
so only on occasion. However, perhaps 
because the country was focused inward 
during the first sixty years of its existence–
or perhaps because the party system would 
permit new forms of cooperation among 
the branches–the cumbersome structure 
of the national government could be toler-
ated. State governments undertook inter-
nal development. Congress tended to give 





the president a free hand for foreign rela-
tions and military operations, when quick 
and decisive actions were necessary, and 
the gains from security or territorial con-
quest could be widely distributed. Other-
wise, the national government was weak 
and presidential leadership thin. The great 
controversies over slavery were resolved by 
Congress, not the president. And then the 
system buckled. The country was saved by 
Lincoln, the greatest leader since Washing-
ton, who ran roughshod over the Madiso-
nian system in countless ways. But it was 
in the twentieth century that separation of 
powers gave way decisively to a system of 
personalistic leadership by the president.
The evolution was not linear, but it was 
unmistakable. Markers along the way in-
cluded Theodore Roosevelt’s innovation 
of appealing directly to the public for sup-
port rather than working through Con-
gress; the concentration of presidential 
power under Woodrow Wilson; the vast 
expansion of the federal bureaucracy un-
der Franklin Delano Roosevelt, including 
the inauguration of a new form of admin-
istrative government; and the Cold War–
era consolidation of presidential control 
over foreign policy and a vast standing 
army. A subtle but important change was 
that the locus of policy-making authori-
ty moved from Congress to the president. 
While Congress continued to debate legis-
lation, the president set the agenda. From 
a legal standpoint, the expansion of pres-
idential power took two forms: the en-
actment of hundreds of statutes that gave 
the president vast discretionary authori-
ty (and large staffs to implement them); 
and presidential assertions of unilater-
al authority under the Constitution. The 
first required active congressional par-
ticipation, the second, acquiescence; but 
they were mutually reinforcing, and the 
Supreme Court–after modest resistance 
that ended with Roosevelt’s court-pack-
ing plan–gave its imprimatur.
While the separation of powers eroded, 
the president’s personal authority expand-
ed. Today, President Obama can use his le-
gal and constitutional authority to imple-
ment many of the policies he prefers. He 
still needs congressional authority for ma-
jor legislative changes, but the president 
initiates the debate by appealing to the 
public and demanding support from the 
thousands of people who owe him favors 
for patronage and other benefits he has be-
stowed or has the capacity to bestow. He 
leads his party, which also gives him au-
thority over Congress when his party en-
joys a majority in both houses, and influ-
ence over Congress even when he does 
not. He nominates judges who advance his 
ideological goals, and fills the top ranks of 
the bureaucracy with his supporters. He 
leads an institution that gathers and pro-
cesses information (especially confidential 
information) much better than Congress 
can, and this informational advantage–
along with the fact that he occupies his of-
fice continuously while Congress comes 
and goes–gives him the ability to set the 
agenda and control the public debate, to 
act and confront Congress, passive and di-
vided as always, with a fait accompli.3
President Obama came to office promis-
ing economic stimulus, financial regulation, 
universal health care, carbon-emission reg-
ulation, immigration reform, and reforms 
to counterterrorism. He set the agenda; 
Congress reacted. Congress gave him the 
legislation he sought in the first three cas-
es: the American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act of 2009, the Dodd-Frank Act, and 
the Affordable Care Act. The second two 
examples are of dual significance. Not only 
did Congress acquiesce in the president’s 
legislative agenda; it vastly expanded his 
authority, and the authority of his succes-
sors, to regulate–that is, to make policy de-
cisions–in the financial and health sectors 
of the economy. While Congress refused to 
give Obama the climate and immigration 
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laws he sought, the president implement-
ed his plans administratively, relying both 
on constitutional norms of executive dis-
cretion and existing statutes that gave him 
vast authority. The regulations were not as 
far-reaching as the legislation he sought, 
but they accomplished a great deal. Obama 
also used his regulatory authority and his le-
gal team to advance lgbt rights. Of all of 
Obama’s major policy initiatives, the only 
one that Congress has completely frustrat-
ed is his plan to shut down the military pris-
on at Guantanamo Bay.
But the erosion of separation of powers 
did not lead to the abuses that the found-
ers feared. While his critics argue–often 
with justice–that Obama has violated con-
stitutional norms, the president is not a dic-
tator; his policies have enjoyed the support 
of popular majorities or large minorities. It 
is a major irony that the presidents whom 
historians and political scientists have de-
clared great leaders have engaged in con-
stitutionally dubious behavior on a grand 
scale: Washington, Lincoln, Theodore Roo-
sevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, Lyndon 
Johnson, Reagan. While Nixon reigns as the 
greatest constitutional lawbreaker–and no 
one, I think, would call him a great leader–
all the presidents who were constitutional-
ly scrupulous have also been the most insig-
nificant and are now forgotten. This raises 
a question. If the separation of powers no 
longer constrains presidents from commit-
ting abuses, what does?
The answer lies in the nature of presiden-
tial leadership, and the way in which the 
psychology of leadership interacts with the 
institutional system we have inherited from 
the founders. While George Washington 
was already turning the office of the pres-
idency into the primary leadership posi-
tion of the country, he did so from within 
the separation-of-powers structure. Wash-
ington was, from the start, the leader of the 
country–in defiance of the Constitution–
but he was also the leader of the executive 
branch. Consistent with the constitution-
al structure, this meant that Washington 
found himself frequently being opposed by 
Congress. And then there was a develop-
ment that the Constitution failed to envi-
sion. Washington soon found himself the 
de facto leader of the Federalists. In later 
years, when the party system fully emerged, 
the president assumed leadership of the 
party. The president became the leader of 
three separate institutions: the country, the 
executive branch, and a party.
To understand the significance of this 
development, we need to examine the con-
cept of leadership more carefully. Broadly 
speaking, a leader is someone who can mo-
tivate a group to act in ways that maximize 
the well-being of the group or promote its 
values. Leaders typically face a collective 
action problem among group members 
who prefer to act in their self-interest un-
less they can be assured that all members 
of the group will act in the group inter-
est. The successful leader provides these 
assurances. Leadership seems to depend 
fundamentally on the ability of the lead-
er to acquire and maintain the trust of the 
group. As long as the group believes that 
the leader will act in the interest of all its 
members, and is intelligent and informed 
enough to make correct choices, the group 
will give the leader its trust, and the leader 
will be able to lead by making choices on 
the group’s behalf.
How do leaders inspire trust in their fol-
lowers? A huge and inconclusive litera-
ture has failed to identify specific person-
ality attributes or skills that are associat-
ed with leadership (though this has not 
stopped thousands of educational insti-
tutions from offering courses in “leader-
ship”).4 In practice, however, we can see 
that the leader demonstrates persuasively 
 –through word and action–that he or she 
shares the group’s interests and will keep 
his or her promises. Most leaders thus de-





pend on their reputation, which they build 
up through a long career of demonstrating 
success in different organizations and in in-
creasingly large and heterogeneous groups. 
Group members typically trust leaders be-
cause the leaders hail from their ranks, have 
demonstrated integrity by keeping their 
promises, and have shown competence by 
making choices that advance the group’s in-
terests. Nearly all American political lead-
ers were born in America (and, of course, 
the president must be by law), and all pres-
idents have held office or other significant 
leadership positions before being elected. 
Presidents who are judged great leaders 
overcome entrenched resistance to imple-
ment policies that advance the public inter-
est; they do so usually by knitting together 
a coalition of groups whose trust they have 
managed to win.
People with identical leadership qual-
ities can be greater or lesser leaders de-
pending on the political contexts in which 
they operate. Some authors emphasize the 
large role of public expectations–which 
are shaped in part by the behavior of pre-
vious presidents–and the way that a presi-
dent’s biography and personality resonate 
with the public at a particular moment in 
history.5 Sometimes there is little scope for 
leadership because the country is either 
content or excessively divided; even an 
exceptionally talented leader may in these 
contexts accomplish little. When people 
have diverse interests, policies that ad-
vance the interest of one group may harm 
another. The leader, then, faces the chal-
lenge of compensating the harmed group 
for its support, or promising to advance 
future policies whose benefits will out-
weigh the group’s short-term losses. Cir-
cumstances also help define the interests 
of the group. A population will be more 
unified when facing a foreign threat than 
when debating the progressivity of taxes. 
This is probably why wartime presidents 
are often remembered as great leaders.
Regarding the question of why presi-
dents do not abuse their positions, the an-
swer is connected to conflicts inhering in 
the institutional arrangements that they 
must manage. In place of the Madisoni-
an triptych of executive-legislative-judi-
cial, let me propose a different tripartite 
structure: executive-party-country. And 
in place of the Madisonian political equi-
librium maintained by the interaction of 
three opposing forces, consider a set of 
concentric circles. The president remains 
the leader of the executive branch under 
the surviving detritus of the constitution-
al structure imagined by Madison. By tra-
dition, the president is leader of the coun-
try and of a party. So the president is leader 
of three different groups at the same time.
Remember that leadership depends on 
maintaining the trust of the group. This 
means acting in the interest of the group, 
which often comes at the expense of peo-
ple outside the group. When the president 
acts as leader of the nation, the group con-
sists of all Americans, while the outsiders 
are foreigners. When the president acts 
as leader of his party, the group consists 
of party members, Democrats or Repub-
licans. When the president acts as leader 
of the executive branch, the group consists 
of the members of the federal bureaucra-
cy, including the military. This means that 
members of one group may be excluded 
from another group, and yet they all look 
to the same person for leadership.
Consider, for example, President Obama’s 
counterterrorism policies, including his use 
of drone strikes to assassinate suspected 
members of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. 
Obama believes that it is in the interest of 
the country to maintain these policies. Ag-
gressive counterterrorism tactics have cost 
Obama the support of some people in his 
party, but they have helped him maintain 
support among people outside his party. 
More aggressive military policies make it 
harder for Republicans to accuse him of be-
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ing soft on terrorism, of being a closet Mus-
lim, or of disregarding American security.
Many of Obama’s policies advance his 
party’s interests. Here I mean both the 
party’s strategic interests and the values 
the party stands for. Immigration reform 
provides a good example. Democrats seek 
to cultivate the support of Hispanics, and 
most Hispanics support Obama’s execu-
tive actions to protect people who entered 
the country illegally. Obama’s support for 
the Dodd-Frank Act was consistent with 
Democrats’ view that the financial indus-
try should be subject to greater regulation. 
The Affordable Care Act also advanced a 
longtime Democratic position that health 
insurance should be provided universally.
Obama, like his predecessors, must main-
tain his leadership of the country and his 
leadership of the party, and it turns out that 
strengthening his leadership of one group 
hurts his leadership of the other. The mech-
anism is straightforward. When Obama 
takes an action that advances the interests 
of one group at the expense of another, the 
losers of the deal begin to wonder whether 
he has their interests at heart; they are more 
inclined to distrust him, even as the bene-
ficiaries’ trust in the president is strength-
ened.
The president’s leadership of the exec-
utive branch introduces yet another com-
plicating factor. The federal bureaucracy 
comprises two groups of people: political 
appointees and civil-service employees. 
Political appointees head the agencies and 
fill their top ranks. Within this group, the 
highest-ranked appointees must be con-
firmed by the Senate; lower-ranked posi-
tions can be filled by the president without 
Senate approval. The president almost al-
ways selects political officials from the pool 
of personal and party loyalists. And these 
people expect to be rewarded for loyal ser-
vice with future promotions, access to the 
president, and plum jobs outside of govern-
ment in think tanks and the private sector.
Civil-service employees are typically ap-
pointed by agency heads who are not per-
mitted to take partisan loyalties into ac-
count when hiring (and in any event, civil- 
service employees will stay in office long 
after the administration turns over). Civil- 
service employees also vastly outnumber 
the political employees, so while they are 
nominally subordinate, their expertise, 
mastery of institutional norms, and num-
bers ensure that they control most of an 
agency’s day-to-day actions. They can also 
embarrass their political leaders by leaking 
confidential documents, complaining to 
the press, dragging their feet when asked 
to implement policies the president favors, 
and threatening to resign.
This is why the risk that the president 
could abuse power though the bureaucracy 
is exaggerated. This risk plays a part in po-
litical discourse, and worries about it have 
a distinguished historical pedigree. After 
all, the Romans who helped bring down 
the Republic owed their power to their 
leadership over the army. In the end, sol-
diers were more loyal to the generals than 
to the state. In 1951, Truman lost confi-
dence in, and the confidence of, General 
Douglas MacArthur, and some historians 
have argued that the country approached 
a coup d’état. In modern times, citizens 
worry that the president can use the civil-
ian bureaucracy to spy on them, stifle dis-
sent, and interfere with personal freedom. 
And there are still respectable commenta-
tors who see the military as a threat to po-
litical independence.6
But as we have seen, to lead the bureau-
cracy, the president needs its trust, and 
maintaining the trust of the bureaucracy 
is in tension with national and party lead-
ership. Reagan was elected on a platform 
that railed against burdensome federal 
regulation, but he could not simply abol-
ish the bureaucracy. He needed it to un-
wind some regulations while maintaining 
others. Thus, he had to temper his criti-





cisms once in office while still trying to ap-
pease the antiregulatory wing of his party. 
Obama campaigned on a platform calling 
for greater transparency of the bureaucra-
cy, but has failed to follow through because 
he needs the trust of officials who work for 
him. In this case, Obama was willing to an-
ger his party in order to appease the bu-
reaucracy, whose assistance he needed to 
advance policies he cared about.
Leadership depends on trust, but people 
tend to distrust those who exercise power 
over them–the president above all. Pres-
idential leadership is constrained by deep 
egalitarian and antiauthoritarian norms 
that constantly replenish the well of sus-
picion from which the public draws when 
it evaluates presidential rhetoric and ac-
tion. The country was settled by dissent-
ers, founded on revolution against a king, 
and expanded by frontiersmen who con-
tributed to a national mythology of self- 
reliance. While presidential leadership is 
acknowledged as necessary, the actions 
of the president and of contenders for the 
presidency are subject to relentless scru-
tiny. This level of scrutiny has increased 
over the decades in tandem with the rise 
of presidential power. Today, the president 
is stripped of all privacy, like the kings of 
old whose bowel movements were exam-
ined by courtiers for signs of disease. Ev-
ery aspect of his private life (with a partial 
exception granted for his young children) 
is considered a legitimate topic for media 
scrutiny and public debate. This is meant 
not only to assure us that our trust in the 
president is not misplaced but, through his 
ritual humiliation, compensate us for our 
subordination to him. This tendency is ev-
erywhere, and the conspiracy theories that 
surround every president–in Obama’s 
case, centering on the question of wheth-
er he was born outside this country and 
is secretly a Muslim–is only an extreme 
version of it. In the United States, conspir-
acy-mongering by alienated political mi-
norities combines with pervasive egalitar-
ian resentment among the wider public–
that a great man (or woman) lords over 
all of us–to provide a checking power far 
more significant than the paper barriers of 
the Constitution. Day after day, the presi-
dent must labor to retain the public’s trust.
The Madisonian system sought to pre-
vent government abuse by creating a set 
of competing institutions that check the 
ambitions of officeholders in each. The 
theory is that if no branch of government 
can dominate the government, then pow-
er will never be concentrated enough to 
threaten real harm. But we can also under-
stand this system in the light of the found-
ers’ fears about dominance by charismatic 
leaders like Caesar or Cromwell. Most of 
the individuals who operate the levers of 
power within the various branches would 
remain faceless cogs in the Madisonian 
wheelwork, while the handful of talent-
ed men who could distinguish themselves 
would never obtain a national following, or 
at least not for long. The system was con-
structed so as to block the emergence of 
dominating leaders at the national level.
But Madison’s system failed because 
it set up too many vetogates, rendering 
the federal government unable to func-
tion effectively. It also underestimat-
ed the unifying power of national lead-
ership. By the twentieth century, it was 
clear that Madison’s system made it im-
possible for a national government to ef-
fectively regulate the new national econ-
omy, to provide for social welfare, and to 
protect the country from foreign threats. 
Activist presidents with outstanding lead-
ership abilities dismantled the Madisoni-
an system piece by piece, paving the way 
for our current president-centered sys-
tem of national administration. Our con-
temporary system heavily relies on the 
magnetism, talent, and organization-
al abilities of sitting presidents, who are 
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kept in check by public scrutiny, the me-
dia, and the challenge of leading different 
institutions and groups in an enormous 
and diverse country.
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